IR Scholars

— by Oscar Nanjia Songe —

Introduction

Presidential term limits in Africa, like those in other parts of the world, serve as important political checks and balances, providing agency and establishing essential rules to prevent the abuse of power. While they aim to safeguard democratic stability and ensure political continuity, recent years have seen a worrying trend in the rise of unconstitutional extension of presidential terms across Africa, often involving attempts to bypass or abolish term limits. This trend, which reverses a positive pattern observed between 2000 and 2015, is linked to a decline in democratic norms and a surge in authoritarianism on the continent. Many African leaders, especially those aspiring to dictatorship, detest constitutional restrictions as they limit their length of stay in power. Consequently, they find new and increasingly sophisticated ways to avoid executive term limits.

Research shows that these brands of leaders seek to stay in power beyond the constitutionally mandated two-term limit, either through their manipulation of electoral processes, illegal amendment of constitutions, or the creation of new positions of influence to maintain political power (Baturo, 2010). More so, some leaders, facing waning popularity or fearing accountability for past socio-political actions, resort to extending their terms as a means to retain power and avoid potential legal challenges or prosecution (Cheeseman, 2010, pp. 139-153). 

According to Ngwang (2021), the 1990s marked a period of significant transformation in political regimes across many African states, ranging from the decline of the one-party system and the fall of numerous military and civilian dictatorships to the introduction of presidential term limits, multi-party politics, the rule of law, and, most importantly, constitutionalism. However, the respect for democratic values, norms, and principles has been fluctuating across the continent, with some states performing better than others. While some political systems, particularly in Southern Africa, have acted responsibly by respecting presidential term limits, thereby paving the way for new leadership, others in West, Central, and East Africa have increasingly sought to remove presidential term limits. This trend has grown in recent years (Fombad, 2017, p.46), with leaders in countries such as Cameroon, Gabon, Togo, Burundi, and, more recently, Côte d’Ivoire attempting to extend their time in power by amending the constitutionally mandated term limits.

According to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2024), the unconstitutional extension of power has continued to influence Africa’s governance landscape in recent years, with leaders of fourteen African countries, since 2002, holding onto power for more than two terms after avoiding term limits. This pattern of evading term limits has risen since 2015, reversing a growing trend of adhering to term limits from 2000 to 2015. Noyes and Reece (2024) support the preceding assertion, determining that “30 out of 54 African countries operate without such a constraint, even as term limits remain extremely popular among ordinary citizens.” They add that according to Afrobarometer surveys, while “more than three-quarters of Africans across 34 countries support these constitutional restrictions on their leaders, recent efforts in Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo illustrate this worrying trend of term-limit evasion and how autocratic parties and leaders are inventing new ways to subvert constitutional restrictions.”

Below is a table depicting countries with either no constitutional two-term limits or two-term presidential term limits that have been either modified or eliminated:

Presidential term extensions have been so predominant and persistent among francophone African countries that all African presidents currently governing in extension to term limits are francophone, except for Uganda, which is Anglophone, and Equatorial Guinea, which is Hispanophone. For example, in 2023, in the Central African Republic, voters approved a new constitution that extended the presidential term from five to seven years and got rid of a two-term limit. The vote allows incumbent president Faustin-Archange Touadéra to remain in power indefinitely. In Togo, long-time leader Faure Gnassingbé (whose family has ruled the country since 1967) signed into law a new constitution that once again eliminated presidential term limits in May 2024. Noyes & Reece (2024) paint a clear picture of the Togolese scenario by stating that:

 “The 2024 Constitution created an entirely new executive position, the powerful President of the Council of Ministers, which has sweeping say over the affairs of government. The office does have a six-year term, but it is renewable so long as the ruling party maintains a majority in parliament. Considering the ruling party has never lost parliamentary polls, which are heavily skewed in its favour, Gnassingbé looks set to rule for life. Indeed, in the most recent parliamentary elections held earlier this year, the party won 108 out of 113 seats.”

In Africa, aspiring dictators are attacking term limits with a vengeance, finding new ways to avoid handing over power. But citizens are overwhelmingly against it, because the skirting of these term limits is misaligned with their will. It must therefore be stated that the unconstitutional extension of presidential term limits remains a determining factor in the breakdown of social and political peace in many countries in Africa (Posner et al., 2018). The agitation surrounding the question of a third or more term stirs passions and violence, sometimes resulting in fatalities, destruction of public and private property, and paralysis of the country’s economy (Amoah, 2023). In Senegal, for example, the ambiguity long maintained by former President Macky Sall regarding his candidacy for a third term exacerbated political tensions and created fertile ground for socio-political protests from 2021 to 2024, making this period one of the most tumultuous chapters in the country’s political history. 

According to Reytjens (2020, p. 275), it is worth noting that while term limit erosion patterns may be regarded as normal political stunts by autocratic leaders or dictators in Africa, they have far-reaching consequences and are directly responsible for the prolonged tenures of certain leaders, who have been in power for 23 years or longer. The rising and worrying trend highlights that extraconstitutional actions of one type (i.e., term limit eradication) create extraconstitutional actions of another (i.e., seizures of power via military coups). Moreover, according to Baturo and Elgie (2019), the term limit suppression impacts the sustenance of good governance, transparency, and accountability, and consequently undermines democratic principles and tenets such as the rule of law, entrenching the restriction of civil and political freedoms, and the eroding of democratic norms, values, principles, and structures.

Thus, this article examines the underlying factors driving the recent surge in term limits’ violations, using key specific case studies in Africa that have been permeated and impacted by this undemocratic practice. The article further explains how presidential term limits are linked to regime characterisation and how they influence political behaviour. It concludes by examining the continental watchdog’s (the African Union) role in managing the undemocratic practice and further opining on the way forward.

Underlying Factors Driving Term Limits’ Violations

Democracy in Africa continues to be dealt a heavy blow with the increase of presidents on the continent seeking re-election for third terms, and more, in office, and in some cases, implementing legislative reforms that pave the way for a life presidency. Some African Presidents, such as Paul Biya of Cameroon,  Faure Gnassingbé of Togo, and, more recently, Alassane Ouattara (in 2025) of the Ivory Coast, have made news headlines across the globe by their decision to seek extra terms. Cameroon’s President Paul Biya, for example, is considered one of the world’s oldest and longest-reigning presidents. He is 93 years old, poised to seek an eighth term in October 2025, and has been ruling the country for 43 years (since 1982). President Gbagbo, on his part, recently received widespread condemnation when he announced he wanted to run for a fourth term, going against the country’s constitution. It is even more damning for the latter because he vehemently opposed such a move when his predecessor, Alassane Ouattara, toyed with the same idea. What then drives these leaders and their counterparts to hold on to power even after their constitutionally mandated terms have elapsed?

To start, Cassani (2020, p. 228-250) opines that the growth in presidential term limit violations in Africa is fuelled by a combination of factors, including, but not limited to, historical, political, and social dynamics. She states that,

The act of ‘tampering with the constitution to bypass term limits is harmful for democracy, as it implies the weakening of the main accountability agents that should check and counterbalance the power of the chief executive, including the parliament, the judiciary, and civil society. Term limit manipulation is typically pursued in three main ways. Some aspiring overstayers simply “asked” the constitutional court’s permission, taking advantage of some constitutional loopholes, including Wade in Senegal and Nkurunziza in Burundi. Others submitted constitutional amendments to parliamentary vote, as in Cameroon, Djibouti, Togo, and Uganda, for instance. Finally, leaders such as Déby, Kagame, and Denis Sassou Nguesso (Republic of the Congo) called a referendum to approve new constitutions. Despite their formal legal nature, these procedures conceal a great deal of court co-optation, legislative vote buying, and biased electoral procedures.

Kieh (2018, pp. 40-41) further avows that the advantage of personalism and incumbency in the different political systems and environments in some African countries has led to what is termed the “hegemonic presidency”, where leaders accumulate excessive power and disregard constitutional constraints. While this phenomenon is often linked to historical and other colonial legacies, the absence of strong institutional checks on executive authority makes it worse. In addition, incumbent presidents are usually at a significant advantage because they wield the power to control state resources, as well as the unchallenged advantage of appointing subservient cronies who are weaponised to serve these dictators’ every command (Carbone and Cassani, 2023). This power, which extends to the dictators’ power and control over the media, is further used as a point of leverage to manipulate term limits. In Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Cameroon, and Uganda, for example, political power is highly personalised with leaders believing that their stay in power is essential for regime survival, which is just a pretext to maintain power and control. Any opposition is therefore seen as a direct threat to the rule of these personalist regimes (Heyl, 2019, pp. 339-361).

Cassani (2020) posits that, where a president has already served substantially more than two terms, they may gain so much power that it becomes extremely difficult to dislodge them. They may enjoy strong public support and tight control over the military, and thus have a high capacity to withstand the threat of forcible removal from office. Dixon and Landau (2020, pp. 385-389) further advance that:

Presidents are confronted with a range of incentives not to leave office, as they believe these term limits often prevent or delay the almost immediate reduction in a president’s power and privileges once they leave office. Even where they retain these privileges, these presidents inevitably face some loss in their power and influence when they leave office. In addition, leaving office inevitably means losing the ability to protect themselves from the threat of future prosecution, imprisonment, or confiscation of their assets due to an increasing trend globally toward holding former leaders accountable for international crimes, a risk which constitutions cannot “insure” former presidents against.

Dixon and Landau (2020, pp. 385-389) further argue that since many fragile democracies lack strong, independent political parties with a long-term interest in the alternation of political power, parties are often a vehicle for a single candidate to run for office as they define their policies in terms identical to those of their president or leader. Rightly or wrongly, a political party’s electoral fate is often perceived by party members as tied to that leader. So, when it comes time for a president to leave office under a term limit, the party thus has little incentive to encourage a president to comply with the relevant constitutional limitation. Instead of encouraging a president to leave office, parties in a fragile democracy may actively encourage a president to stay beyond the constitutional term limit as a means of increasing the chances that the party itself will continue to hold power.

Consistent with Mangala (2020, pp. 15-23), the proliferation of weak democratic institutions in African countries is another major factor that drives the rise in term limit violations. Inefficiencies and other structural challenges impacting the electoral commissions, parliament, and the judiciary are contributory factors that make it easier for presidents to manipulate term limits through constitutional amendments and re-interpretation of the prescripts. These deficiencies, including non-credible and ineffective opposition parties lacking adequate capacity to effectively challenge incumbent presidents and the absence of strong, independent watchdog institutions, contribute to the problem, as they allow presidents to act with impunity, thereby eroding democratic principles and undermining the rule of law (Dawson & Young, 2021). It must be noted that, even with organised opposition, incumbents can still manipulate term limits through constitutional amendments or re-interpretations, especially if they control key institutions like the judiciary. 

Establishing the link between unconstitutionally extended presidential term limits in Africa and their influence on political behaviour

Unconstitutional extended presidential term limits in Africa have a close connection to regime types, often reflecting traits of autocratic or semi-autocratic governance. This section, therefore, explores the implications of these constitutional extensions and establishes its connection to regime types and characterisation, and finally delineates the impact they have on political agency and behaviour within Africa.  

Primarily, the practice of extending presidential term limits unconstitutionally across Africa, be it through legal loopholes, amendments, or blatant disregard for the constitutional frameworks, often signals a departure from democratic norms and principles. Thus, entrenched autocratic regimes where power is concentrated in the hands of a single leader and his socio-political cronies usually exhibit these actions, thereby undermining democracy and the rule of law and in the process preserving personal control over the state (Reyntjens, 2016, pp. 61 – 68). In trying, therefore, to analyse the connection between unconstitutionally extended presidential term limits and regime characterisation in Africa, Grauvogel & Heyl (2020) posit that it is essential to understand the concept of regime hybridity. African political systems are often described as “hybrid regimes,” combining both democratic and authoritarian elements. These regimes may have formal democratic structures (e.g., multi-party elections, regular voting), but they lack substantive democratic practices, such as genuine political competition, respect for civil liberties, and adherence to the rule of law.  

Unconstitutionally extended presidential terms typically emerge in countries where the political system exhibits authoritarian characteristics. For instance, in countries like Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, and Rwanda, presidents have used constitutional amendments to ensure they stay in power indefinitely, often arguing that their continued leadership is necessary for national stability and economic growth, although the centralisation of power prevents meaningful opposition from developing. As a result, the absence of strong institutional checks on power and the manipulation of legal frameworks are hallmarks of dictatorship, power abuse, and the erosion of democratic norms and principles. Contrasting this outlook with countries (especially in Southern Africa) where term limits are respected, such as South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Ghana (West Africa), it can be deduced that the latter scenario boasts relatively stronger institutional frameworks where the political system is considered stable with democratic practices upheld. This stark contrast between the two political dispensations underscores how unconstitutionally extended term limits play a crucial role in determining the overall regime type of a country.

With regard to unconstitutional extensions of political term limits’ influence on political behaviour in Africa, Dawson & Young (2021, pp. 276-290) believe that there are profound effects at all levels within a political structure. Considering that it relates to the actions, attitudes, and decision-making processes of political actors, including but not limited to civil society, voters, political parties, and leaders, these effects are often negative, breeding a political climate of fear, repression, manipulation, and control. To start, the unconstitutional extension of term limits arises from elites trying to manoeuvre the political will and structure to serve their self-serving interests. These elites often align themselves with the executive to secure positions of power and privilege. Hence, this pursuit of political power tends to create a culture of patronage and clientelism where the elite’s political alignment and support are rewarded with state resources. Therefore, in the absence of institutional checks and balances, elites become emboldened and are willing to lend support to the executive’s power grab, even if it violates constitutional acts. This, in essence, weakens political competition with political parties becoming increasingly fragmented or coerced into the interests of the regime in power (Grauvogel & Heyl, 2020).

Moreover, unconstitutional presidential term extensions in Africa significantly impact voters’ behaviour and the broader public’s relationship with the political process. When political leaders manipulate the constitutional framework to remain in power, it often undermines public trust in the democratic process as well as fosters political apathy or disillusionment. For instance, the Ivorian President, Laurent Gbagbo’s recent attempt to extend his rule beyond the required constitutional limits has sparked large-scale protests and global criticism. Despite the people’s determination to denounce the illegal act in the Ivory Coast, for example, such actions could lead to widespread skepticism about the legitimacy of the electoral process and the government as a whole. In other countries, such as Uganda or Burundi, where voters’ rights have been greatly marginalised and their political rights curtailed, their citizens become powerless or disengaged, leading to decreased voter turnout and increased political polarisation (Osei et. al., 2021, pp. 251-257).

Also, the repressive nature of regimes that extend term limits often leads to the suppression of civil society organisations and dissenting voices, especially from the opposition. For example, the practice of engaging security forces to clamp down on protests, arrest opposition leaders, and curtail free speech creates an environment where political behaviour is shaped by fear, rather than free will. This repression discourages citizens from actively participating in democratic processes, thereby diminishing their capability to influence political outcomes in their respective environments.

From a geostrategic and political legitimacy perspective, it is vital to understand how the unconstitutionally extended terms of African presidents impact their countries’ socio-political legitimacy and their relations internationally. Such impact is seen through the lens of broad-based sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and condemnation from international and continental bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU). On the one hand, while such condemnations and sanctions could, to an extent, slow down or partially deter ‘wannabe’ autocrats from pursuing unconstitutional political practices, on the other hand, they could actually reinforce the autocratic nature of these regimes, since defaulting leaders often become less willing to engage internationally, and therefore courting international isolation and leaving their citizens powerless and more destitute. For example, after President Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi sought an unconstitutional third term in office in 2015, his regime faced a range of sanctions, with international aid suspended or withdrawn completely. This not only isolated the country politically but also led to economic difficulties, affecting the lives of ordinary citizens and contributing to long-term political instability (Vandeginste, 2016: 52-53).

Summarily, many unconstitutional extended presidential terms in Africa remain intricately linked to the characterisation of regimes as either authoritarian or hybrid, often signalling a retreat from democratic ideals and institutional principles. These actions directly influence political behaviour by creating an environment where elites manipulate the political system for personal gain, voters become disillusioned, and civil society faces repression. By undermining democratic norms, presidential term-limit extension fosters political instability and entrenches autocracy, bad governance, and a lack of transparency and accountability across Africa.

African Union’s Position vis-à-vis the Unconstitutional expansion of presidential term limits: Response and Limitations

According to Wiebusch and Murray (2019), the AU’s legal arsenal to counter the unconstitutional change of government is enshrined both in the AU Constitutive Act and in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG), with clear definitions of what constitutes coups and other types of unlawful and undemocratic power grabs. According to the AU (2007), this legal instrument explicitly prohibits constitutional amendments extending presidential term limits in ways that undermine democratic tenets, with Article 23 clearly stating that ‘any unconstitutional change of government’ is a violation of the AU’s principles, which include upholding constitutional order and human rights.

Adebajo (2018) also adds that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), although non-binding, is an instrument designed to promote good governance, democracy, and the rule of law. Thus, all signatory countries are evaluated on their adherence to democratic tenets or norms. However, the APRM has not been hugely effective in enforcing compliance when term limits are altered. Schmidt (2019) views the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) as a structure designed to respond to crises and political instability in Africa. The African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) has upheld the principle that the making and amendments of constitutions must not be motivated by self or personal interests and should not be amended to subvert the people’s will (AU Commission, 2009). However, it has been argued that the African Union’s PSC’s reaction to the unconstitutional extension of presidential term limits is often reactive rather than proactive, and it lacks the ability to impose meaningful sanctions on violators.

To add, Ani (2021) states that ‘the AU has instituted several legal standards aimed at monitoring broad-based unconstitutional government changes on the continent. However, the practice has proven that the AU is more active with certain constitutional violations and passive with others, thereby signifying double standards.’ He adds that ACDEG prohibits ‘any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments that constitute an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.’ However, the fact that the AU has never made use of this provision despite the several constitutional coups observed across the continent between 2000 and 2024, and notably, where incumbents amend their constitutions to eliminate term and age limits, is worrying (Ani, 2021). Deducing from the above, it can be argued that although the AU may have called on member states to respect procedures in case of any constitutional amendment, it is seemingly too cautious to toughly engage with proponents, opting for quiet diplomacy in most cases, which is highly ineffective.

Moffat (2023) acknowledges that ‘the AU, in a pre-emptive measure to deter authoritarian leaders from attempting to alter their term limits, formulated the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.’ He adds that, ‘the Charter, after much campaigning and support from civil society, came into existence in 2012 after the required number of countries ratified it.’ Considering this, Moffat (2023) further acknowledges the document’s importance and highlights ‘the comprehensive provisions for the promotion of the rule of law, the respect for human rights and the holding of democratic elections, the institutionalization of legitimate authority of the representative government as well as democratic changes of government.’ Additionally, ‘it binds signatories to best practices in the management of elections, and crucially acknowledges that unconstitutional changes of government are a threat to stability, peace, security and development.’

While the AU should be commended to an extent, for committing AU member states to refrain from the ‘amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government’ as one of the ‘illegal means of accessing or maintaining power’ by having these phrases included in the Charter; however, inconsistencies related to the continental body’s handling of term limit violations have been mounting. One of the most prominent cases of how the AU handled an unconstitutional presidential term extension is Burundi, where President Pierre Nkurunziza in 2015 pursued a third term in office despite the Burundian constitution’s two-term limits. The AU’s response was initially cautious and diplomatic. While the AU condemned the decision, it refrained from taking strong action, citing concerns over regional stability and the risk of exacerbating violence (McGowan, 2015). While the AU sent a high-level mission to mediate the crisis that led to widespread violence in Burundi, the AU did not implement strong measures to hold him accountable (Osei-Hwedie, 2014). Therefore, the failure of the AU to enforce the provisions of the ACDEG highlights its weak enforcement mechanisms and the complex political environment in which it operates.

Adebajo (2018) further points out that in Rwanda, President Paul Kagame’s government amended the constitution in 2015, aimed at removing term limits, enabling him to hold on to power until 2034. While the AU did not immediately intervene in Rwanda’s case, it faced significant international and domestic criticism. Critics, therefore, argued that Kagame’s continued rule undermines democratic values and sets a precedent for other leaders to follow suit. Despite the AU’s rhetoric in favour of democracy, it failed to take concrete action in Rwanda, possibly due to Kagame’s leadership role within the AU and his influence in Pan-African affairs. This, in turn, highlights the AU’s reluctance to challenge its most influential leaders, even when they violate fundamental democratic principles.

In Chad, President Idriss Déby, who had been ruling for over 25 years, amended the country’s constitution in 2018 aimed at removing presidential term limits entirely. The AU’s response was muted, as Déby was a key figure in the region’s counter-terrorism efforts, particularly in the Sahel (Schmidt, 2019). In Guinea, President Alpha Condé altered the constitution in 2020 to allow for a third term, despite significant opposition within the country and across the continent. In both scenarios, the AU’s response was limited to verbal condemnations, and no significant sanctions or interventions were put in place. The case of Chad and Guinea, alongside many others, underscores the AU’s inconsistent application of its democratic norms. Resultantly, the AU’s failure to take decisive action in this case underscores the organisation’s tendency to prioritise stability, peace, and security over democratic principles when dealing with influential leaders who are seen as important in regional politics.

The key challenges and limitations of the AU’s reaction or response regarding the rising cases of Africa’s unconstitutional term limits can be attributed to a lack of enforcement mechanisms, geopolitical and strategic interests, changing regional dynamics, the role of Sub-Regional organisations, and inconsistent application of norms and practices governing democracy. From a geopolitical and strategic interest perspective, one of the key challenges the AU faces when responding to unconstitutional political changes is balancing democratic ideals against geopolitical and strategic interests. Usually, African leaders who alter presidential term limits are influential figures whose countries may hold strategic importance regionally. For instance, Déby’s Chad is a key partner in counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel, and Kagame’s Rwanda is central to AU initiatives (Adebajo, 2018). These considerations often lead to a reluctance to take strong action against such leaders.

More so, while the AU has the power to suspend member states engaging in unconstitutional political changes through platforms such as coup d’états and unlimited presidential terms, it has rarely exercised this power, particularly in cases involving powerful or influential leaders. This could be the result of a lack of any credible or strong enforcement mechanism in the AU that imposes penalties on failing democracies. This enforcement gap continuously challenges the AU’s political and democratic ideals as well as its ability to enforce significant policy and institutional frameworks on the defaulting countries.

Conclusion and Way Forward

Constitutional amendments in Africa often challenge democratic tenets and principles such as constitutionalism, democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. Although constitutions are designed to be stable and reflect a nation’s enduring values, amendments frequently focus on extending presidential terms, weakening the principle of the separation of powers, and undermining judicial independence. To worsen matters, domestic mechanisms to safeguard against such changes are often insufficient, with constitutional provisions and referenda susceptible to manipulation. These amendments therefore threaten and weaken African countries’ judicial independence, and further consolidate the executive’s power. This untenable situation continues to erode any form of constitutionalism, accountability, transparent and good governance, the rule of law, and democracy that regional and continental bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, respectively, purport to uphold.

The rising cases of constitutional amendments with regard to term limits across Africa aimed at consolidating executive power often concentrate authority in the hands of a few, especially the president. This concentration of power often leads to a lack of transparency and accountability, and further impairs checks on executive actions, thereby diminishing the role of other democratic institutions and hampering the functioning of a robust system of checks and balances. Resultantly, consolidating power in the executive branch becomes highly detrimental for democratic governance, as it diminishes people’s participation in public discourse, as well as their representation in diverse socio-political practices or spaces. These impairments in the long term further limit civilians’ ability to participate in free and fair elections and therefore, undermine democratic institutions’ credibility. This erosion, therefore, permeates socio-political spaces, with power becoming highly centralised, political competition stifled, and democratic principles hugely subverted.

Unconstitutional amendments of presidential term limits in Africa will significantly impact the values underpinning the Africa Agenda 2063, a long-term, ambitious pan-African vision and strategic action plan for transforming Africa in the next 50 years. With its lagging responses, inconsistency, weak or ineffective enforcement mechanisms, political pragmatism, and diverging geopolitical considerations, the AU’s legal frameworks to check such violations have not been effective in strengthening its commitment to democratic principles. Therefore, the AU may need to reconsider its approach, potentially by enhancing the powers of its decision-making bodies, such as the Peace and Security Council and the African Peer Review Mechanism. Furthermore, the AU must address its reliance on regional bodies and develop a more coherent and unified response to unconstitutional term limit extensions if it is to enhance its credibility and effectiveness in promoting democracy across the African continent.

The fact that the AU’s predominant use of the ACDEG normative guidelines for the unconstitutional changes of governments has not been effective indicates that it must actively adopt a more practical or proactive normative framework that identifies and checks rogue political aspirations, especially from dictators. This normative framework should contain rules of a legal nature that set out precisely how constitutional amendments with regard to presidential term limits are governed and how the African Union and RECs will respond in a situation where these rules are contravened. These rules must be clear and predetermined so that the institution responsible for an immediate response knows its obligations to act accordingly and avoid the African Union and a REC from proverbially pointing fingers at each other. There must be policy considerations in this normative framework aimed at uniting African states under the same united object of furthering the rule of law, constitutionalism, and democracy, and reaffirming the essence of a constitution and why it cannot be amended or replaced to advance one’s political ambitions.

Another possible solution is the establishment of a commission or a similar body that is functionally independent of the executive branch of African states. It is widely recognised that upholding constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule of law calls for constitutionally entrenched institutions that are not under any legislative or executive control. This is to avoid a lack of political will from tainting the process of embedding a culture of constitutionalism in Africa. This may be seen as a body of experts whose primary role is to monitor, consider, develop, and implement broader and substantive conceptions of the rule of law, democracy, constitutionalism, and good governance.

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