— by Joelle Alkontar —
Military strategist Frank Hoffman first popularized the term “hybrid warfare” in his 2007 paper “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges”, where he defined it as a blend of conventional military force, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal activity, often employed simultaneously by an adversary to achieve political objectives. States utilize hybrid warfare by combining military and non-military tools to achieve political, economic, and various kinds of objectives. Despite the increasing traction it has gained over the years, hybrid warfare is not a modern strategy. In fact, hybrid warfare can be dated back to the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta, who employed both a mix of regular armies and irregular methods to achieve objectives and gain an edge over the other. In his iconic work “The Art of War”, Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu discussed strategies that align with hybrid warfare principles, such as using deception and unconventional methods to achieve victory. Given its ongoing relevance and prominence in contemporary international relations, this article aims to briefly explore how hybrid warfare is used in international relations today and its consequences on target states and security.
Hybrid warfare has especially gained momentum after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, where Russia’s actions such as deployment of unmarked troops, so-called “little green men”, disinformation campaigns, and cyberattacks aiming at disrupting critical infrastructure, were all used in conjunction with conventional military tactics. More recently, in 2021, Belarus was accused of orchestrating a migrant crisis by facilitating the movement of Middle Eastern migrants to the borders of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, weaponizing human migration to destabilize neighboring countries and the European Union. In June 2023, the Kremlin retaliated against Europe’s support for Ukraine by breaching several European banking institutions, including the European Investment Bank, disrupting financial operations and causing widespread concern. Later that year, in November, Denmark faced its most significant cyberattack to date, resulting in the shutdown of 22 power companies and leaving many citizens without electricity. Sabotage on cables and maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea by cargo ships has also become very common in recent years. Hence, Russia’s hybrid war tactics against Western Europe serve the purpose of eliciting fear among the nations, causing them to spend a huge portion of their resources to bolster their own defenses against these threats instead of allocating them to support Ukraine, for example. The goal of hybrid warfare is often not about the sabotage itself but about the effects this sabotage causes in terms of public opinion, fear-mongering, etc.
This mix of diplomatic, security, economic, information, and technological warfare tactics does not always come from states and is sometimes conducted by non-state actors, such as ISIS, who blended terrorism with media operations to recruit supporters, spread propaganda, and undermine state authority. These entities often target democratic regimes and weaponize the free flow of information that is prominent in these democratic systems. While trying to blur the lines between war and peace, perpetrators utilizing these tactics contribute to undermining the target states as they often aim to exploit existing divisions, paralyze decision-making, etc. By doing so, the heavy costs and risks associated with conventional warfare such as a full-scale war between Russia and Nato are mitigated, while still achieving useful objectives for the perpetrator state. Another important point to note is that, since hybrid warfare operates beneath the threshold of conventional warfare, its strategies decrease the likelihood of military retaliation or international condemnation. Indeed, according to the article “Countering Hybrid Threats” written in May 2024 on NATO’s official website, NATO and the EU have enhanced cooperation in dealing with cyber threats with a focus on cyber defense, strategic communications, and others. In light of the fact that many analysts expect a surge in hybrid warfare tactics if the war in Ukraine comes close to ending and Russia sees itself as potentially losing the war, these are crucial measures that need to be taken.
Moreover, this surge is also expected to increase in speed, intensity, and scope due to rapid technological change and the increasing global connectivity of our modern world. A joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of Finland and Germany on the severed undersea cable in the Baltic Sea exemplifies the serious threats posed by hybrid warfare: “We are deeply concerned about the severed undersea cable connecting Finland and Germany in the Baltic Sea. The fact that such an incident immediately raises suspicions of intentional damage speaks volumes about the volatility of our times.” This statement depicts how physical national borders today only constitute a part of the story, as the theater of a nation’s security has become much broader, including vast interconnected digital networks and infrastructure which can pose serious threats and act as destabilizing factors when targeted. Therefore, collective defense organizations like NATO need to continue expanding their agendas to include thorough strategies to counter the risks posed by hybrid warfare. The main challenge is that the primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted country. Given that fact, it is very important to note that there is an undeniable variation between Nato member countries and targets of hybrid warfare in their capabilities and the resources available to invest in countering these threats. With this key issue in mind, will targets of hybrid warfare be successfully able to navigate these unprecedented challenges?
Sources:
- NATO. (2024, May 7). Countering hybrid warfare. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm
- Federal Foreign Office of Germany. (2024, January 11). Joint statement by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen on Finland’s membership of the Arctic Council. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/2685132-2685132
- Parlow, A. (2024, November 8). Hybrid war and national security: NATO, the US, and the West. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/hybrid-war-and-national-security-nato-us-and-west
- Reichborn-Kjennerud, E., & Cullen, P. (2016). What is Hybrid Warfare? Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07978
- Wither, J. K. (2016). Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare. Connections, 15(2), 73–87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326441
